In this article, we analyze how various historical modi…cations to welfare and old age pensions programs have a¤ected poverty in Canada.
Introduction
On may 19th 2006, a committee of experts from the United Nations responsible for the follow up of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, a treaty that Canada signed in 1976, strongly reprimanded the Canadian government due its waning commitment to upholding the objectives of this treaty. In spite of a vigorous economy and budget surpluses, it would seem that the poor are being left behind. The committee of experts underlines the impact of a decreasing number of unemployed bene…ting from unemployment insurance; welfare transfers that aren't representative of the costs of maintaining basic living standards; a¤ordable housing is rare, and its tenants are usually in dire situations; food banks are visited far too often; superior education has become a luxury; and …nally, the fundamental rights of workers such as the rights of being syndicated and going on strike are being questioned. The objective of this article is to analyze how various historical modi…cations to welfare and old age pensions programs have a¤ected poverty in Canada.
The remainder of the article is presented as follows. The following sections present the analytical framework. The third section presents the results of our analysis and the fourth section concludes.
Historical and analytical framework
During the early 90's, budgets presented by the Canadian government as well as provincial governments showed recurring de…cits. To remedy this unsustainable situation, these governments brought on a series of measures to control public spending. Some of these measures a¤ected the Canadian social safety net. Regarding the unemployment insurance, in 1993, Bill C-113 modi…ed the income replacement rate from 60% to 57%. In the following year, Bill C-17 reduces this rate to 55%. Regarding welfare, these transfers The …rst scenario reinstates the unemployment insurance rate to 60% (Simulation 1). We do however ignore the changes brought to admissibility criteria of this program. The second scenario increases welfare transfers to compensate for the loss of real income incurred by the lack of indexation (Simulation 2). The third scenario simulates the impact on poverty that would of followed if old age pensions were not indexed to in ‡ation (Simulation 3).
When measuring poverty, we use the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) class of poverty indices. These poverty indices have the following form:
where N is the number of individuals, z is the poverty line which we have …xed at 50% of the median income, y i is the income of individual i and is the poverty aversion parameter. If = 0, the resulting index is the well known and widely used "headcount"index. If > 0, not only the incidence but the depth of poverty are considered by the resulting "poverty gap"index.
Finally, if > 1, the resulting index is increasingly sensitive to inequality.
Thus, we will use these three (P 0 , P 1 and P 2 ) indices.
To make the equivalent incomes comparable across the various regions, we use the implicit de ‡ator presented by Makdissi and Groleau (2002) . When considering the composition and size of the survey's families, we use an equivalence scale which normalizes income. If we de…ne total household income as x i , we have y i = x i =n e with :
Where n e is the number of equivalent adults in the household, n a is the number of adults in the household and n c is the number of children. The parameter ' is used to di¤erentiate the cost of a child compared to an adult. . These estimates will be used as a benchmark of comparison for the results that will be generated by the simulations stated earlier.
Simulation results
In this section, we simulate the levels of poverty which would have been observed considering the three scenarios presented earlier. To begin, this …rst sub section analyses the levels of poverty for the entirety of the population.
The other two sub sections is dedicated to impact of poverty on various family types and on children. Table 2 displays the poverty levels for our three scenarios. We notice that the reduction of income replacement rates of unemployment insurance have had little e¤ect on the poverty indices 2 . However, the non indexation of welfare transfers has increased P 0 by 8.0%, P 1 by 10.1% and P 2 by 8.6%. On the other hand, the elderly population seems to have been protected seeing how indexing the pensions have avoided an increase in poverty for the whole of the population of 12.6% for P 0 , 11.1% for P 1 and 7.0% for P 2 .
An overview

Breaking down of the impacts of Simulation 2 on various family types
Seeing how the non indexation of welfare transfers seems to have been a political decision that has hindered the …ght against poverty in Canada, it is interesting to see how this political decision has a¤ected poverty levels across various family types. Table 3 , we present the results of the second simulation broken down by family type. These results show that both single parent family types and families with children are greatly a¤ected by this political decision. The family types touched by this perverse a¤ect are, in decreasing order of magnitude, mother led single parent families, followed by the father led single parent families and …nally, the couples with children group. These results remain constant regardless of which poverty index is used. The magnitude of the e¤ects induced by the political decisions are the following; for P 0 , an increase of 25.1% for mother led single parent families, 12,8% for father led single parent families and 9.4% for couples with children. For the P 1 index, these increases are of, 25.4%, 13.4% and 9.7% respectively and for P 2 , of 19.3%, 10.1% and 7.8%. Seeing how those who are the most a¤ected by this political decision are the family groups with children, the following section will deal explicitly with the impact of these policies on children in Canada.
Non indexation des prestations de sécurité de revenu et pauvreté des enfants
In 1989, the Parliament of Canada had adopted a resolutions aiming to com- Table 4 : Simulation 2, Poverty among children by family types Table 4 presents the results of not indexing the welfare transfers on child poverty in Canada. The direct consequence of this political decision has been that P 0 has increased by 27.6% for children living in single mother families, 13.1% for those living in single father families and 10.7% for those living with both parents. For the P 1 index, these increases have been of 30.1%, 12.8% and 9.8% respectively and for the P 2 index, of 21.5%, 10.6% and 7.1%.
We can note that the decision not to index welfare transfers has hit hard with Canada's children, particularly those living in single mother families.
This political decision was taken in spite of the parliamentary resolution to eliminate child poverty.
Conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed the impact of certain major budgetary restriction decisions that have a¤ected Canada's social safety net. We note that cuts brought to the income replacement rate of unemployment insurance have a¤ected various families, but have not had a signi…cant impact on poverty. We can also note that the Canadian governments decision to continue indexing old age pension transfers have protected this segment of the population from increases in poverty. However, the decision to stop indexing welfare transfers has had an important impact on poverty levels in Canada, especially in relation to child poverty where single mother families are the most perversely a¤ected group. Regarding the poverty levels of children living in single mother families, the Canadian government does not seem to have held its own resolution to eliminate child poverty. Audet, Boccanfuso and have shown that the recent decision (spring 2006) to eliminate the national childcare program which the previous government had started to implement will signi…cantly increase poverty in this family group.
